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Abstract
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information
in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999)
to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution
concept. We show that it is also su¢ cient under a mild ￿no worst alternative￿condition. In
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11 Introduction
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in
(correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be
necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept.
We show that it is also su¢ cient under a ￿no worst alternative￿(NWA) condition. In particular,
no economic condition is required.
We are able to obtain this strong result because - like much of the classical implementation
literature - we allow in￿nite mechanisms (including ￿integer games￿ ); and - unlike the classical im-
plementation literature - we allow for stochastic mechanisms. Recent papers by Bochet (2007) and
Benoit and Ok (2008) have shown extremely permissive results for Nash implementation allowing
stochastic mechanisms.1 We also allowed for stochastic mechanisms in our earlier work on robust
implementation in general environments (Bergemann and Morris (2008)); the results in this note
are obtained by adapting arguments in that work.2
Another approach in the classical implementation literature is to restrict attention to ￿nite
mechanisms (for ￿nite environments), but to restrict attention to pure Nash equilibria in the de￿-
nition of implementation. In this case, ￿modulo￿games can play the same role as integer games.
We consider rationalizable implementation in ￿nite mechanisms. With ￿nite mechanisms ratio-
nalizable strategies are exactly those surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
With ￿nite mechanisms (our results would hold more generally with ￿regular mechanisms￿where
best responses are well-de￿ned), we identify necessary conditions for rationalizable implementation
allowing stochastic mechanisms. In particular, a strict (and thus stronger) version of Maskin
monotonicity is required. And strict (and thus stronger) versions of the necessary conditions of
Moore and Repullo (1990) are also necessary. In this sense, there is no gain to allowing stochastic
mechanisms in the absence of in￿nite mechanisms. These results parallel our robust implemen-
tation results in Bergemann and Morris (2008): the restriction to ￿nite (or regular) mechanisms
leads to stronger - strict - versions of the necessary conditions for unrestricted mechanisms.
Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) have shown that a mild economic condition is su¢ cient for
virtual implementation in rationalizable strategies in ￿nite mechanisms. We show that a mild
condition, which we refer to the common most preferred outcome property is necessary. This
establishes at least some economic condition is required in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a).
1Their results are discussed in section 3. Serrano and Vohra (2007) have shown how allowing stochastic imple-
menting mechanisms can give rise to weak su¢ cient conditions for Bayesian implementation in mixed strategy Bayes
Nash equilibrium.
2In Bergemann and Morris (2009a), we discuss analogous results for implementation in rationalizable strategies
in standard incomplete information environments.
2These results narrow (small) open questions in the literature. The existing literature shows that
Maskin monotonicity is necessary for Nash implementation in any mechanism (even if stochastic
mechanisms are allowed). Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) shows that if implementation is made
easier by (i) requiring only virtual implementation; and (ii) imposing a weak domain restriction rul-
ing out identical preferences; then implementation is always possible even if it is made harder by (iii)
requiring ￿nite mechanisms; and (iv) requiring the stronger solution concept of rationalizability.
Our result shows that it is possible to exactly implement a social choice function, in rationaliz-
able strategies, even if domain restriction (ii) fails, as long as in￿nite, stochastic, mechanisms are
allowed.
2 Setup
The environment consists of a collection of I agents (we also write I for the set of agents); a ￿nite
set of possible states ￿; a countable set of pure allocations Z (we write Y ￿ ￿(Z) for the set of
lotteries on Z); and, for each agent i, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : Z ￿￿ ! R,
extended to lotteries as ui : Y ￿ ￿ ! R with
ui (y;￿) =
X
z2Z
yzui (z;￿).
A mechanism M is given by M =
￿
(Mi)
I
i=1 ;g
￿
, where each Mi is countable, M = M1 ￿￿￿￿￿MI
and g : M ! Y .
The environment and the mechanism together describe a game of complete information for each
￿ 2 ￿. We will use (correlated) rationalizability as a solution concept.3 Our formal de￿nition will
coincide with the standard de￿nition with ￿nite or compact message spaces. But we will also allow
in￿nite, non-compact, message spaces; in this case, our de￿nition is equivalent to one introduced
in Lipman (1994). Let a message set pro￿le S = (S1;:::;SI), where each
Si 2 2Mi; (1)
and we write S for the collection of message set pro￿les. The collection S is a lattice with the natural
ordering of set inclusion: S ￿ S0 if Si ￿ S0
i for all i. The largest element is S = (M1;:::;MI). The
smallest element is S = (?;?;:::;?).
3The original de￿nition of rationalizability of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) required agents￿conjectures over
their opponents￿play to be independent. We follow the convention of some of the recent literature (e.g., Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994)) in using ￿rationalizability￿for the correlated version of rationalizability (see Brandenburger
and Dekel (1987) for an early de￿nition and discussion).
3We de￿ne an operator b￿ : S ! S to iteratively eliminate never best responses with b￿ =
￿
b￿
1;:::b￿
i;:::;b￿
I
￿
and b￿
i is de￿ned by:
b￿
i (S) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
mi 2 Mi
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
there exists ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) such that
(1) ￿i (m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 Sj for each j 6= i;
(2) mi 2 argmax
m0
i2Mi
X
m￿i2M￿i
ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);￿)￿i (m￿i);
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
: (2)
We observe that b￿ is increasing by de￿nition: i.e., S ￿ S0 ) b￿ (S) ￿ b￿ (S0). By Tarski￿ s ￿xed
point theorem, there is a largest ￿xed point of b￿, which we label SM;￿. Thus (i) b￿ ￿
SM;￿￿
= SM;￿
and (ii) b￿ (S) = S ) S ￿ SM;￿. If mi 2 S
M;￿
i , we say that message mi is rationalizable in the
complete information game parameterized by ￿.
We can also construct the ￿xed point SM;￿ by starting with S - the largest element of the lattice
- and iteratively applying the operator b￿. If the message sets are ￿nite (as discussed in sections 4
and 5), we have
S
M;￿
i ,
\
n￿0
b￿
i
￿h
b￿
in ￿
S
￿￿
.
In this case, the solution concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
(see Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)).
But if the mechanism M is in￿nite, trans￿nite induction may be necessary to reach the ￿xed
point.4 It is useful to de￿ne
S
M;￿
i;k , b￿
i
￿h
b￿
ik￿1 ￿
S
￿
￿
;
again using trans￿nite induction if necessary. Thus S
M;￿
i are the set of messages surviving (trans-
￿nite) iterated deletion of never best responses. It is possible to show formally that S
M;￿
i is the set
of messages that agent i might send consistent with common certainty of rationality and the fact
that payo⁄s are given by ￿ (Lipman (1994)).
Now a social choice function (SCF) f is given by f : ￿ ! Y . Mechanism M implements
f in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that, for all ￿, SM;￿ 6= ? and m 2 SM;￿ )
g (m) = f (￿). SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that
M implements f in rationalizable strategies. Mechanism M "-implements f in rationalizable
strategies if there exists M such that, for all ￿, SM;￿ 6= ? and m 2 SM;￿ ) kg (m) ￿ f (￿)k ￿ ".
SCF f is "-implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism M such that
M "-implements f in rationalizable strategies. SCF f is virtually implementable in rationalizable
strategies if, for each " > 0, f is "-implementable in rationalizable strategies.
4Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the trans￿nite induction required. As he notes ￿we remove
strategies which are never a best reply, taking limits where needed￿ .
43 Exact Implementation in General Mechanisms
Restricted to social choice functions, Maskin monotonicity states:
De￿nition 1 (Maskin monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es Maskin monotonicity if
1. f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
whenever ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) ) ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
y;￿0￿
for all i and y; or,
equivalently,
2. f (￿) 6= f
￿
￿0￿
implies there exist i and y 2 Y with ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) and ui
￿
y;￿0￿
>
ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
.
This condition, which is necessary for Nash implementation, is also necessary for rationalizable
implementation. The latter condition states that there exists at least one agent who, if the true
state were ￿0 and she expected other agents to claim the state is ￿, could be o⁄ered a reward y
that would give her a strict incentive to ￿report￿the deviation of other agents, where the reward
y would not tempt her if the true state was in fact ￿.
Proposition 1 If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Let M be a mechanism that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Thus, for each
￿, there exists m￿
i (￿) 2 S
M;￿
i for each i satisfying g (m￿ (￿)) = f (￿). Suppose f
￿
￿0￿
6= f (￿). Then
there exists k (perhaps trans￿nite) such that
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿
i;k
for each i but
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
= 2 S
M;￿
i;k+1 (￿)
for some i. To see why, observe ￿rst that m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿
i;0 = Mi for all i. Now if m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿
i
for all i, we would have m￿ ￿
￿0￿
2 SM;￿ and thus f
￿
￿0￿
= f (￿), a contradiction.
Thus there exists e mi such that
ui
￿
g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿
￿
> ui
￿
g
￿
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿
￿
= ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
.
Suppose that ui
￿
g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿0￿
> ui
￿
g
￿
m￿ ￿
￿0￿￿
;￿0￿
= ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
. This contradicts
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿0
i . So we must have ui
￿
g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
.
Writing y , g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
, we have ui (y;￿) > ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
and ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
y;￿0￿
.
5Oury and Tercieux (2009) have shown that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for
￿continuous￿ partial implementation of a social choice function, where ￿continuous￿ means the
small mechanism must work for types that are close to the complete information types in the
product topology. An alternative way to prove their result would be show that ￿continuous￿partial
implementation implies full implementation in rationalizable strategies and thus (by proposition 1)
the necessity of Maskin monotonicity.
Proposition 1 parallels part (1) of Theorem 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2008). We need an
extra condition for the su¢ ciency result.
De￿nition 2
Social choice function f satis￿es ￿no worst alternative￿ (NWA) if, for each i and ￿, there exists
y
i (￿) such that
ui (f (￿);￿) > ui
￿
y
i (￿);￿
￿
: (3)
Property NWA requires that an agent never get his worst outcome under the social choice
function. The NWA property appears in Cabrales and Serrano (2008) as a su¢ cient condition to
guarantee implementation in best-response dynamics. Given a set of allocations
n
y
i (￿)
o
￿2￿
it is
useful to de￿ne the average allocation y
i of this set by setting
y
i ,
1
#￿
X
￿2￿
y
i (￿): (4)
We now construct an auxiliary set of allocations, denoted by
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿￿
￿;￿0, which use the existence
of the allocations
n
y
i (￿)
o
￿2￿
. The allocations
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿￿
￿;￿0 are going to appear in the canonical
mechanism to be de￿ned shortly where they guarantee the existence of better response for agent i
should the remaining agents choose to misreport the true state. In particular, the following Lemma
establishes that for agent i the allocation zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
represents an improvement if the true state is ￿
but the other agents misreport it to be ￿0. It also establishes that zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
would not constitute an
improvement relative to f
￿
￿0￿
if the true state were indeed ￿0.
Lemma 1
If social choice function f satis￿es ￿no worst alternative￿(NWA) then there exists
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿￿
￿;￿0
such that for all ￿;￿0 with ￿ 6= ￿0:
ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
> ui
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
;￿0￿
; (5)
and
ui
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
;￿
￿
> ui
￿
zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
;￿
￿
. (6)
6Proof. We begin with the allocations
n
y
i (￿)
o
￿2￿
given by De￿nition 2. First note that we
can assume without loss of generality that, for all ￿ and ￿0, we have
ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
y
i
￿
￿0￿
;￿0
￿
(7)
and
ui
￿
y
i (￿);￿0
￿
￿ ui
￿
y
i
￿
￿0￿
;￿0
￿
. (8)
If this were not true, we could de￿ne the set
Y i , ff (￿)g￿2￿ [
n
y
i (￿)
o
￿2￿
and de￿ne a new allocation y
i
(￿) by setting
y
i
(￿) 2 argmin
y2Y i
ui (y;￿). (9)
Now, we have for all ￿ 2 ￿:
ui (f (￿);￿) > ui
￿
y
i (￿);￿
￿
￿ ui
￿
y
i
(￿);￿
￿
,
where the strict inequality follows from NWA and the weak inequality follows from construction of
(9). Without loss of generality we can therefore take the allocation y
i (￿) to coincide with y
i
(￿),
and it follows that the inequalities (7) and (8) are satis￿ed.
Based on the allocations
n
y
i (￿)
o
￿2￿
we de￿ne a new set of allocations for all ￿:
zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
, (1 ￿ ")y
i
￿
￿0￿
+ "y
i,
with y
i as de￿ned in (4), and for all ￿;￿0 with ￿ 6= ￿0:
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
, (1 ￿ ")y
i
￿
￿0￿
+ "
￿
y
i +
1
#￿
￿
f (￿) ￿ y
i (￿)
￿￿
: (10)
By NWA, the weak inequalities (8) and the ￿niteness of the state space ￿, we can ￿nd a su¢ ciently
small, but positive, " > 0 such that for all ￿ and ￿0:
ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
> ui
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
;￿0￿
: (11)
Now we observe that that the only di⁄erence between zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
and zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
is the fact that the
lottery y
i (￿) is replaced by the lottery f (￿). But now by NWA, this is clearly increasing the
expected utility of agent i in state ￿, and hence we have for all ￿;￿0 with ￿ 6= ￿0 :
ui
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
;￿
￿
> ui
￿
zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
;￿
￿
, (12)
7which establishes the second strict inequality (6).
We establish the su¢ cient conditions for implementation in rationalizable strategies by means
of a canonical mechanism. The canonical mechanism shares many basic features with the imple-
mentation mechanism suggested by Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) to establish complete information
implementation in the presence of mixed strategies, and is modi￿cation of the original mechanism
suggested by Maskin (1999). The aforementioned allocations
￿
zi
￿
￿;￿0￿￿
￿;￿0 appear in the mecha-
nism if agent i reports a state ￿ di⁄erent from the reported state ￿0 by all the other agents. In this
case, the allocation zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
is chosen with positive probability, yet this probability can lowered
by a suitable message of agent i and be replaced by favorable allocation zi
￿
￿;￿0￿
.
Proposition 2 If I ￿ 3 and f satis￿es Maskin monotonicity and NWA, then f is implementable
in rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We prove the proposition by constructing an implementing mechanism M = (M;g).
Each agent i sends a message mi =
￿
m1
i;m2
i;m3
i;m4
i
￿
, where m1
i 2 ￿, m2
i 2 Z+, m3
i : ￿ !
Y;m4
i 2 Y . The third component of the message pro￿le will allow agent i to suggest an allocation
m3
i (￿) contingent on all the other agents j 6= i reporting m1
j = ￿. The outcome function will make
use of the ￿uniformly worse outcome￿for agent i de￿ned earlier by y
i. Note that for each ￿ 2 ￿ -
by Lemma 1 - there exists y 2 Y , such that
ui (y;￿) > ui (zi (￿;￿);￿). (13)
Now the outcome g (m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule 1: If m1
i = ￿ and m2
i = 1 for all i, pick f (￿).
Rule 2: If there exists i 2 I such that
￿
m1
j;m2
j
￿
= (￿;1) for all j 6= i and
￿
m1
i;m2
i
￿
6= (￿;1), then
we go to two subrules:
(i): if ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui
￿
m3
i (￿);￿
￿
, pick m3
i (￿) with probability 1￿ 1
m2
i+1 and zi (￿;￿) with proba-
bility 1
m2
i+1;
(ii): if ui (f (￿);￿) < ui
￿
m3
i (￿);￿
￿
, pick zi (￿;￿) with probability 1. The allocation zi (￿;￿) was
established in Lemma 1.
Rule 3: In all other cases, we identify a pivotal agent i by requiring that m2
i ￿ m2
j for all j 2 I and
that if m2
i = m2
j, then i < j. The rule then requires that with probability
￿
1 ￿ 1
m2
i+1
￿
we pick m4
i,
and with probability 1
I
￿
1
m2
i+1
￿
we pick y
i.
8Claim 1. It is never a best reply for agent i to send a message with m2
i > 1 (i.e., mi 2 b￿
i
￿
S
￿
)
m2
i = 1).
Proof for Claim 1. Suppose mi =
￿
m1
i;m2
i;m3
i;m4
i
￿
2 S
M;￿
i and m2
i > 1. Then Rule 2 or 3 will
be triggered with probability one. But in this case, whatever agent i￿ s beliefs ￿i (m￿i) about the
other agents￿messages, his payo⁄ can be increased by modifying mi appropriately, in particular by
increasing the integer choice from m2
i. Given the message mi with m2
i > 1, the set of messages of
the remaining agents in which Rule 2 is triggered is de￿ned by:
M2
￿i ,
￿
m￿i 2 M￿i
￿ ￿m1
j = ￿0 and m2
j = 1 for some ￿0 and for all j 6= i
￿
; (14)
and the set of messages of the remaining agents in which Rule 3 is triggered is the complement set,
de￿ned by:
M3
￿i , M￿i n M2
￿i: (15)
Suppose ￿rst that agent i has a belief ￿i 2 ￿(M￿i) under which Rule 3 is triggered with
positive probability, so that ￿i
￿
M3
￿i
￿
> 0. Then agent i can become the pivotal player and realize
his most preferred allocation at pro￿le ￿ with an arbitrarily large probability, though strictly below
1, through the choice a larger integer b m2
i > m2
i and the choice of an allocation b m4
i. Recall from
(13) that there exists b m4
i 2 ￿ with ui
￿
b m4
i;￿
￿
> ui (yi;￿). Now agent i can always improve his
expected utility conditional on Rule 3 by choosing an even larger integer.
Now suppose that agent i believes that Rule 2 will be triggered with positive probability, so that
￿i
￿
M2
￿i
￿
> 0. We ￿rst observe that the choice of b m4
i does not e⁄ect the outcome of mechanism
conditional on Rule 2. Now we know that there exists b m3
i such that:
X
￿02￿
0
B
@
X
fm￿i2M2
￿ijm1
j=￿0for all j6=ig
￿i (m￿i)
1
C
A
￿
ui
￿
b m3
i
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
￿ ui
￿
zi
￿
￿0;￿0￿
;￿
￿￿
> 0. (16)
It follows that the choice of a large integer b m2
i > m2
i together with the existence of an allocation
b m3
i (￿) satisfying (16) strictly improves the expected utility of agent i in case that Rule 2 is triggered,
which yields the desired contradiction.
Claim 2.
￿
￿;1;m3
i;m4
i
￿
2 S
M;￿
i for all i, ￿, m3
i, m4
i.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that player i in state ￿ puts probability 1 on each other agent j sending
a message of the form
￿
￿;1;m3
j;m4
j
￿
. If player i announces a message of the form
￿
￿;1;m3
i;m4
i
￿
,
he gets payo⁄ ui (f (￿);￿). If he announces a message not of this form, the outcome is determined
by Rule 2. But his payo⁄ from invoking Rule 2 is bounded above by ui (f (￿);￿).
9Claim 3. If mi =
￿
￿0;1;m3
i;m4
i
￿
2 S
M;￿
i , then f
￿
￿0￿
= f (￿).
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose mi =
￿
￿0;1;m3
i;m4
i
￿
2 S
M;￿
i . Given the message mi, we can de￿ne the
set of messages of the remaining agents which trigger Rule 1, 2 or 3, respectively. In particular, we
de￿ne:
M1
￿i (mi) ,
￿
m￿i 2 M￿i
￿
￿￿
m1
j;m2
j
￿
=
￿
m1
i;m2
i
￿
for all j 6= i
￿
; (17)
and M2
￿i (mi) and M3
￿i (mi) are as de￿ned earlier in (14) and (15), respectively. Now consider a
given belief ￿i (m￿i) of agent i. If ￿i
￿￿
m￿i 2 M1
￿i (mi)
￿￿
= 0, then Rule 2 or 3 will be triggered
with probability one and by exactly the argument of Claim 1, the message mi cannot be a best
reply by agent i. Suppose now that the belief ￿i (m￿i) of agent i is such that:
0 < ￿i
￿￿
m￿i 2 M1
￿i (mi)
￿￿
< 1. (18)
While we still argue that agent i can strictly increase his expected utility by selecting an integer
b m2
i > 1, we observe that a complication arises as with ￿i (m￿i) given by (18), a choice of b m2
i > 1
leads from an allocation determined by Rule 1 to an allocation determined by Rule 2, and hence
the realization of an unfavorable allocation y
i with positive probability. But now we observe that
by selecting b m3
i
￿
￿0￿
= f
￿
￿0￿
, by selecting a favorable allocation b m4
i and by choosing an integer b m2
i
su¢ ciently large, the small loss in Rule 2 can always be o⁄set by a gain in Rule 3 relative to the
allocation achieved under g (mi;m￿i).
So if mi =
￿
￿0;1;m3
i;m4
i
￿
2 S
M;￿
i , it follows player i must be convinced that each other player
must be choosing a message of the form
￿
￿0;1;m3
j;m4
j
￿
, and hence
￿i
￿￿
m￿i 2 M1
￿i (mi)
￿￿
= 1.
Thus there must exist a message of the form
￿
￿0;1;m3
j;m4
j
￿
2 S
M;￿
j for all j. But suppose that
for some j, there existed y such that uj
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
￿ uj
￿
y;￿0￿
but uj (y;￿) > uj
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
. Then
￿
￿0;2;y;y
￿
would be a better response for player j than
￿
￿0;1;m3
j;m4
j
￿
, a contradiction. Thus
for all j, uj
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
￿ uj
￿
y;￿0￿
) uj
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
￿ uj (y;￿). Thus by Maskin monotonicity,
f
￿
￿0￿
= f (￿).
Completion of proof. Claims 1, 2 and 3 together imply that mi 2 S
M;￿
i ) m2
i = 1 and f
￿
m1
i
￿
=
f (￿). Thus m 2 SM;￿ ) g (m) = f (￿).
This proposition parallels part 2 of Theorem 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2008). The mechanism
M used here allows each agent to propose a menu of choices m3
i =
￿
m3
i (￿)
￿
￿2￿. The menu m3
i
gives agent i the opportunity to select an appropriate allocation in case that Rule 2 is triggered.
Maskin (1999) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) have used the menu structure to establish complete
information implementation in the presence of mixed strategies. In our su¢ ciency argument, the
10NWA property replaces the no veto property which commonly appears in the su¢ ciency argument
for implementation in Nash equilibrium. Yet, in terms of the proof, the role of the NWA property
is quite distinct from the no veto property. The NWA property guarantees that in the augmented
mechanism, any report in state ￿ in which an agent expresses his disagreement with the remaining
agents (i.e. m2
i > 1) cannot be a rationalizable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed
that if an agent were to express his disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would
only be possible in equilibrium if it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed
f (￿).
Bochet (2007) and Benoit and Ok (2008) report su¢ cient conditions for implementation in Nash
equilibrium strategies using stochastic mechanisms.5 Restricted to our environment (with social
choice functions and an outcome space given by the set of lotteries over a ￿nite set of outcomes),
their results can be stated as follows. The top strict di⁄erence condition is satis￿ed if whenever
there exist i and z￿ 2 Z with uj (z￿;￿) ￿ uj (z;￿) for all j 6= i and all z 2 Z, there exist agents k
and l with uk (z￿;￿) > uk (z;￿) and ul (z￿;￿) > ul (z;￿) for all z 6= z￿. Bochet (2007) shows that if
the top strict di⁄erence condition holds and I ￿ 3, then f is Nash implementable if and only if f is
Maskin monotonic (on lotteries). The top coincidence condition is satis￿ed for every i, if there exists
at most one z￿ 2 Z satisfying uj (z￿;￿) ￿ uj (z;￿) for all j 6= i and z 2 Z. Social choice function
f is weakly unanimous if fz￿g =
I
\
i=1
fz0 : ui (z0;￿) ￿ ui (z;￿) for all z 2 Zg ) f(￿) = z￿. Benoit
and Ok (2008) shows that if the top coincidence condition holds and f is weakly unanimous, then
f is implementable in pure Nash if and only if f is Maskin monotonic (on deterministic outcomes).
Our NWA condition does not imply nor is it implied by any of these extra conditions required for
su¢ ciency.
4 Exact Implementation in Finite Mechanisms
We do not have su¢ cient conditions for rationalizable implementation in ￿nite mechanisms. How-
ever, we can report stronger necessary conditions than those for Nash implementation using in￿nite
mechanisms.
Cabrales and Serrano (2008) introduce a ￿quasimonotonicity￿condition which is necessary and
almost su¢ cient for implementation in adaptive best response dynamics.
5While we assume agents have expected utility preferences over lotteries, Bochet (2007) and Benoit and Ok (2008)
make weaker monotonicity assumptions on the extension of ordinal preferences to lotteries.
11De￿nition 3 (Quasimonotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es quasimonotonicity if
1. f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
whenever ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y;￿) ) ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
> ui
￿
y;￿0￿
for all i and y; or,
equivalently,
2. f (￿) 6= f
￿
￿0￿
implies there exist i and y 2 Y with ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y;￿) and ui
￿
y;￿0￿
￿
ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
.
The premise of quasimonotonicity is nestedness of the strict lower contour sets and the premise
of Maskin monotonicity is nestedness of the (weak) lower contour sets. Thus neither implies the
other. We will identify a ￿strict Maskin monotonicity￿condition whose premise is that strict lower
contour sets are contained in (weak) lower contour sets. Thus strict Maskin monotonicity is - at
least in principle - a strengthening of both Maskin monotonicity and quasimonotonicity:
De￿nition 4 (Strict Maskin Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es strict Maskin monotonicity if
1. f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
whenever ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y;￿) ) ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
y;￿0￿
for all i and y; or,
equivalently,
2. f (￿) 6= f
￿
￿0￿
implies there exist i and y 2 Y with ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y;￿) and ui
￿
y;￿0￿
>
ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
.
In our lottery setting, all three versions of monotonicity will be equal under weak conditions:
De￿nition 5 (No Best Alternative)
Social choice function f satis￿es ￿no best alternative￿(NBA) if, for each i and ￿, there exists y￿
such that ui (f (￿);￿) < ui (y￿;￿).
Property NBA is analogous to NWA, requiring that an agent never gets his favorite alternative
under the social choice function.
12Lemma 2
1. Maskin monotonicity and NWA imply strict Maskin monotonicity;
2. Quasimonotonicity and NBA imply strict Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. (1.) Suppose f is Maskin monotonic. Suppose f
￿
￿0￿
6= f (￿). Then there exist i and
y such that ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) and ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
< ui
￿
y;￿0￿
. By NWA, there exists y￿ with
ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y￿;￿). Now let e y = "y￿ + (1 ￿ ")y. For small enough ", ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (e y;￿)
and ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
< ui
￿
e y;￿0￿
. Thus strict Maskin monotonicity is satis￿ed.
(2.) Suppose f is quasimonotonic. Suppose f
￿
￿0￿
6= f (￿). Then there exist i and y
such that ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y;￿) and ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
y;￿0￿
. By NBA, there exists y￿ with
ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
< ui
￿
y￿;￿0￿
. Now let e y = "y￿+(1 ￿ ")y. For small enough ", ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (e y;￿)
and ui
￿
f (￿);￿0￿
< ui
￿
e y;￿0￿
. Thus strict Maskin monotonicity is satis￿ed.
Now we have:
Proposition 3 If f is ￿nitely implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satis￿es strict
Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Let M be any mechanism that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Thus, for
each ￿, there exists m￿
i (￿) 2 S
M;￿
i for each i satisfying
g (m￿ (￿)) = f (￿).
Suppose f
￿
￿0￿
6= f (￿). Then we claim that there exists k such that m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿
i;k for each i, but
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
= 2 S
M;￿
i;k+1 for some i. To see why, observe ￿rst that m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿
i;0 = Mi for all i. Now
if m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
2 S
M;￿
i for all i, we would have m￿ ￿
￿0￿
2 SM;￿ and thus f
￿
￿0￿
= f (￿), a contradiction.
Thus there exists e mi such that
ui
￿
g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿
￿
> ui
￿
g
￿
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿
￿
= ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
. (19)
Suppose that ui
￿
g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
g
￿
m￿ ￿
￿0￿￿
;￿0￿
= ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
; this would imply e mi 2
S
M;￿0
i . But from (19), we know that g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
6= g
￿
m￿
i
￿
￿0￿
;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
, a contradiction to the
hypothesis of ￿nite rationalizable implementation; thus ui
￿
g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
;￿0￿
< ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
.
Now writing y , g
￿
e mi;m￿
￿i
￿
￿0￿￿
, we have ui (y;￿) > ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿
￿
and ui
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿0￿
> ui
￿
y;￿0￿
.
13The following strengthening of Maskin monotonicity was introduced by Moore and Repullo
(1990).
De￿nition 6 (Condition ￿)
Social choice function f satis￿es condition ￿ if there exists ￿nite B ￿ Y , and, for each i and ￿,
Ci (￿) ￿ B with
ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) (20)
for all y 2 Ci (￿), such that for all ￿￿ 2 ￿, the following three conditions are satis￿ed:
1. If ui (f (￿);￿￿) ￿ ui (y;￿￿) for all y 2 Ci (￿) and i, then f (￿￿) = f (￿);
2. If ui (y￿;￿￿) ￿ ui (y;￿￿) for some i and y￿ 2 B, for all y 2 Ci (￿) and uj (y￿;￿￿) ￿ uj (y;￿￿)
for all y 2 B and j 6= i, then f (￿￿) = y￿;
3. If y￿￿ 2 B and ui (y￿￿;￿￿) ￿ ui (y;￿￿) for all y 2 B and i, then f (￿￿) = y￿￿.
Social choice function f satis￿es condition ￿strict ￿￿if the above conditions hold replacing the weak
inequality in (20) with the strict inequality.
Proposition 4 If I ￿ 3 and f is ￿nitely implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satis￿es
condition strict ￿.
Proof. Suppose M ￿nitely implements f in rationalizable strategies. We ￿rst construct sets B
and Ci (￿) that will be used in the constructive proof of the proposition. Let B = fy 2 Y jg (m)g.
Fix ￿. There exists m￿ (￿) 2 SM;￿ such that g (m￿ (￿)) = f (￿). Let
Ci (￿) =
￿
y 2 B
￿ ￿y 6= f (￿) and y = g
￿
mi;m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
for some mi 2 Mi
￿
.
Observe that y 2 Ci (￿) ) ui (f (￿);￿) > ui (y;￿). (We observe that this strictness does not arise
in the case of Moore and Repullo (1990)). To see why, suppose that y 2 Ci (￿) and ui (f (￿);￿) ￿
ui (y;￿). Since
m￿
i (￿) 2 argmax
mi
ui
￿
g
￿
mi;m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
;￿
￿
,
we have that ui (f (￿);￿) = ui (y;￿). By de￿nition of Ci, y 6= f (￿) and there exists b mi such that
y = g
￿
b mi;m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
:
But this implies b mi 2 S
M;￿
i , so
￿
b mi;m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
2 SM;￿, and thus y = g
￿
b mi;m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
= f (￿), a
contradiction.
14Now ￿x any ￿￿.
1: If ui (f (￿);￿￿) ￿ ui (y;￿￿) for all y 2 Ci (￿) and i, then m￿ (￿) 2 SM;￿￿
and so f (￿￿) = f (￿).
This veri￿es (1).
2: If ui (y￿;￿￿) ￿ ui (y;￿￿) for some i and y￿ 2 B for all y 2 Ci (￿), then there exists b mi such that
y￿ = g
￿
b mi, m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
and
b mi 2 argmax
mi
ui
￿
g
￿
mi;m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
;￿￿￿
.
If in addition, uj (y￿;￿￿) ￿ uj (y;￿￿) for all y 2 B and j 6= i, then
m￿
j (￿) 2 argmax
mj
uj
￿
g
￿
b mi;mj;m￿
￿i;j (￿)
￿
;￿￿￿
.
So
￿
b mi, m￿
￿i (￿)
￿
2 SM;￿￿
and f (￿￿) = y￿. This veri￿es (2).
3: If y￿￿ 2 B, there exists b m 2 M with g (b m) = y￿￿. If, in addition, ui (y￿￿;￿￿) ￿ ui (y;￿￿) for all
y 2 B and i, then b m 2 SM;￿￿
and thus g (b m) = y￿￿ = f (￿￿). This veri￿es (3).
The proof of Proposition 4 closely follows the proof of Moore and Repullo (1990), except for an
extra step where we establish the strictness of equality (20). Otherwise, the argument is the same
except that we have a social choice function rather than a correspondence and use rationalizable
strategies rather than Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.
De￿nition 7 (Condition ￿2)
Suppose I = 2. Social choice function f satis￿es condition ￿2 if ￿ holds and in addition, for any
￿;￿0 2 ￿, there exists y￿ 2 C1 (￿) \ C2
￿
￿0￿
such that for all ￿￿ 2 ￿,
u1 (f (￿);￿￿) ￿ u1 (y;￿￿); 8y 2 C1 (￿) and u2
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿￿￿
￿ u2 (y;￿￿), 8y 2 C2
￿
￿0￿
) f (￿￿) = y￿.
Social choice function f satis￿es condition ￿strict ￿2￿ if the above conditions hold replacing the
weak inequality in (20) with the strict inequality.
Proposition 5 If I = 2 and f is ￿nitely implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satis￿es
condition strict ￿2.
Proof. Let y￿ = g
￿
m￿
1 (￿);m￿
2
￿
￿0￿￿
. If
u1 (f (￿);￿￿) ￿ u1 (y;￿￿) for all y 2 C1 (￿);
and
and u2
￿
f
￿
￿0￿
;￿￿￿
￿ u2 (y;￿￿) for all y 2 C2
￿
￿0￿
15then
￿
m￿
1 (￿);m￿
2
￿
￿0￿￿
2 SM;￿￿
and thus y￿ = g
￿
m￿
1 (￿);m￿
2
￿
￿0￿￿
= f (￿￿).
See Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjostrom (1991), Danilov (1992) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2004)
for related characterizations of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for Nash implementation.
5 Virtual Implementation in Finite Mechanisms
Preferences are non-trivial if, for each i and ￿, there exist z and z such that
ui (z;￿) > ui (z;￿):
A set of agents X ￿ f1;:::;Ig have identical preferences at ￿ if there exists v : Z ! R such that,
for each i 2 X, ui (￿;￿) is an a¢ ne transformation of v (￿). The economic assumption of Abreu
and Matsushima (1992a) implies that no pair of agents have identical preferences at any ￿ and
preferences are non-trivial. It also makes the slightly stronger economic requirement that each
agent can be made better o⁄ without making any other agent better o⁄.
De￿nition 8 (AM Economic Condition)
The AM economic condition is satis￿ed if, for each i and ￿, there exist z and z such that ui (z;￿) >
ui (z;￿), and uj (z;￿) ￿ uj (z;￿); for all j 6= i.
Theorem (Abreu and Matsushima (1992)) If the AM economic assumption is satis￿ed, all
social choice functions are ￿nitely virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies.
We show that this assumption cannot be weakened too much. In particular, we will show that
a necessary condition for ￿nite virtual implementation in rationalizable strategies is that f satis￿es
the common most preferred outcome property. This property requires that agents￿utility when
they have common preferences is at least as high as their commonly most preferred outcome from
the domain of f.
De￿nition 9 (Common Most Preferred Outcome)
Social choice function f satis￿es the common most preferred outcome property if identical prefer-
ences at ￿￿ imply
ui (f (￿￿);￿￿) = max
￿
ui (f (￿);￿￿); for all i:
16Proposition 6 If f is ￿nitely virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satis￿es
the common most preferred outcome property.
Proof. Fix any mechanism M. Let Y M be the range of g, i.e.,
Y M = fy jg (m) = y for some m 2 M g.
Suppose there are identical preferences which are represented by v (￿) at ￿￿. Now let Y M;￿￿
be the
collection of most preferred outcomes in Y M in state ￿￿ and let M
M;￿￿
i be the set of messages of
agent i that might give rise to those most preferred outcomes, i.e.,
Y M;￿￿
= argmax
y2Y M
v (y)
and
M
M;￿￿
i =
n
mi 2 Mi
￿ ￿
￿g (mi;m￿i) 2 Y M;￿￿
for some m￿i 2 M￿i
o
.
Now M
M;￿￿
i ￿ S
M;￿￿
i . This can be shown by induction: suppose g (m) 2 Y M;￿￿
; m 2 S
M;￿￿
0 = M;
suppose m 2 S
M;￿￿
k ; then m￿i 2 S
M;￿￿
￿i;k and v (g (mi;m￿i)) ￿ v (g (m0
i;m￿i)) for all m0
i ) mi 2
S
M;￿￿
i;k+1.
Now suppose M that "-implements f in rationalizable strategies. Now y￿ 2 Y M;￿￿
)
ky￿ ￿ f (￿￿)k ￿ ". Also, for any ￿, there exists y 2 Y M such that ky ￿ f (￿)k ￿ ". By as-
sumption, v (y￿) ￿ v (y).
Thus if f is ￿nitely virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies, it must be that for each
" > 0 and ￿, there exist y￿;y such that ky￿ ￿ f (￿￿)k ￿ ", ky ￿ f (￿)k ￿ " and v (y￿) ￿ v (y). We
conclude that v (f (￿￿)) ￿ v (f (￿)).
Presumably, the logic of this example could be extended to show that the virtual implementation
results under incomplete information of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), Bergemann and Morris
(2009b) and Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2008) will not work with identical preferences and
thus their weak economic assumptions cannot be completely dispensed with.
6 Discussion
6.1 Social Choice Correspondences
We reported results for social choice functions only. The results do not extend to social choice
correspondences in a natural way. In particular, we will show that Maskin monotonicity is not
a necessary condition for implementation in rationalizable strategies (according to at least one
natural de￿nition of these terms).
17It is not obvious how to extend our de￿nition of implementation of an SCF in rationalizable
strategies to implementation of an SCC in rationalizable strategies. We describe one approach.
A (pure outcome) social choice correspondence (SCC) is a mapping F : ￿ ! 2Z￿
?. A social
choice correspondence F is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism
M with g
￿
SM;￿￿
= F (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿. A SCC F is Maskin monotonic if: whenever z￿ 2 F (￿)
and ui (z￿;￿) ￿ ui (z;￿) ) ui
￿
z￿;￿0￿
￿ ui
￿
z;￿0￿
for all i and z; then z￿ 2 F
￿
￿0￿
. Note that this
de￿nition is given in terms of pure outcomes.
Now consider the following example. There are 2 agents; ￿ = f￿;￿g; Z = fa;b;c;dg; payo⁄s
are given by the following table:
a b c d
￿ 1 + ";0 0;1 + " 1;1 1 + 2";1 + 2"
￿ 1 + ";0 0;" 1;1 1 + 2";1 + 2"
The social choice correspondence is F￿ (￿) = fa;b;c;dg and F￿ (￿) = fdg.
Now F￿ is not Maskin monotonic. To see why, note that a 2 F￿ (￿) and that ui (a;￿) ￿
ui (z;￿) ) ui (a;￿) ￿ ui (z;￿) for all i and z. So Maskin monotonicity would require a 2 F￿ (￿).
But F￿ is implementable in rationalizable strategies. Consider the mechanism M with Mi =
￿
m1
i;m2
i;m3
i
￿
and deterministic g given by the following matrix:
m1
2 m2
2 m3
2
m1
1 a b c
m2
1 b a c
m3
1 c c d
Now, for each i, S
M;￿
i;k = Mi for all k and thus S
M;￿
i = Mi. Thus g[SM;￿] = fa;b;c;dg = F￿ (￿).
But in state ￿, we have
S
M;￿
1;0 =
￿
m1
1;m2
1;m3
1
￿
and S
M;￿
2;0 =
￿
m1
2;m2
2;m3
2
￿
;
S
M;￿
1;1 =
￿
m1
1;m2
1;m3
1
￿
and S
M;￿
2;1 =
￿
m3
2
￿
;
S
M;￿
1;2 =
￿
m3
1
￿
and S
M;￿
2;2 =
￿
m3
2
￿
;
and thus g[SM;￿] = fdg = F￿ (￿).
186.2 Domain Restrictions
In this note, the outcome space is a lottery space and we restricted preferences to be expected utility
preferences. These assumptions rule out domain restrictions often assumed in the literature. For
example, it is often assumed that for every pro￿le of strict orders on outcomes, there is a ￿ where
agents have that ordinal ranking of outcomes. If we imposed this assumption on the lottery space,
we would have a contradiction with the expected utility assumption. If we imposed this restriction
only on pure outcomes Z, it is not clear if existing results would go through.
B￿rgers (1995) proved a striking result about implementation in rationalizable strategies using
￿nite mechanisms: he showed that if every unanimous strict ranking of outcomes was in the domain
of preferences, then any rationalizable social choice function was dictatorial. Moore and Repullo
(1990) show the related result that, with two players, condition ￿2 implies that any e¢ cient social
choice rule where the domain includes all strict orderings is dictatorial. It is not clear if and how
these results can be mapped into our setting for the reasons given above.
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